Introduction
Product innovation in microfinance is aimed at responding to the variety of poor clients' needs, i.e. to develop and sustain the offer of a range of client-led products. A more market-oriented approach would help the industry both to increase its social impact and to improve long-term institutional sustainability. Indeed, product design can serve as a powerful targeting mechanism for microfinance institutions, because it determines the type of clients attracted and the extent of the benefits clients receives from financial services (Woller, 2002; Johnson, 2005; Copestake, 2007) . Assessing the needs of a target market segment and designing appropriate products, it might help microfinance institution to attain its social mission -for example, avoiding perverse phenomenon known as mission drift (Armendariz and Szafarz, 2010) and guarantee that larger portion of productivity surpluses are attributed to poor clients (Labie, 2009; Hudon and Perilleux, 2010) . This paper focuses on innovative market-oriented products that combine two important features: flexibility and enforcement mechanisms.
The poor need flexible products that allow transactions adapted to their cash-flow. Such products help the poor to smooth consumption, when income is irregular and unpredictable, and to cover unexpected expenditures. Financial products designed for poor clients should also include sanctions or other enforcement mechanisms to mitigate behavioural anomalies, such as lack of self-control, intra-household disagreement and attentional failure. Enforcement mechanisms enhance control over client's budget and assure that payments -savings, loan repayments and insurance contributions -are duly made (Collins et al., 2009 ).
Typically, flexibility -for example, in the form of allowance for ex post contract renegotiationincreases the client's temptation to renege on his or her commitment, discouraging financial discipline. Conversely, enforcement mechanisms -for example, social sanctions or the requirement for the client to provide financial collateral -encourage discipline in the client.
This paper aims at providing new insights on the trade-off between product flexibility and discipline in microfinance. We ask how flexible features and enforcement devices may be mixed in microfinance contracts in ways that permit the adaptation of transactions to clients' cash needs while at the same time enhancing the clients' financial discipline. At this purpose, we have assembled a set of examples of flexible financial products offered by microfinance institutions worldwide. 4
The importance of financial discipline
For the purposes of this discussion we use Laureti's (2011) use of the term financial discipline: it is a "desirable behaviour of clients, characterized by their obedience to financial commitments, which is encouraged thanks to some enforcement mechanism". In the literature, commitments are arrangements that channel the client's decisions by making certain choices more expensive, sometimes even infinitely expensive, and by providing incentives that promote certain choices (Amador et al., 2006; Bryan et al., 2010) . This definition highlights two peculiarities of commitments: i) the restriction of the clients' choices to a sub-set of all possible choices; and ii) the incorporation of mechanisms, typically in the form of sanctions, ensuring that clients obey the rules consistently. For the sake of clarity, in this discussion we call enforcement mechanisms those devices associated with commitments which encourage clients to fulfil their obligations. In the same sense, commitments are credible when the enforcement mechanisms associated to them are strong enough to push clients to make the necessary effort to fulfil their obligations.
Credit, savings or insurance contracts are different types of financial commitments, which could be associated to a range of enforcement mechanisms, of various strength. For example, microcredit contracts are commonly considered credible commitments, driven by various enforcement mechanisms, e.g. social pressure, holding of financial collateral as security for loans and/or dynamic incentives. Also the weekly instalment schedule ubiquitous in microcredit contracts is considered an effective enforcement device, imposing financial discipline through the regularity and frequency of payments and meetings (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010) . Commitment savings plans may fix times and amounts for deposits and/or impose restrictions on withdrawals (Ashraf et al., 2003) . Enforcement mechanisms associated to commitment savings should encourage clients to make deposits duly on time, for example, by sending staff at the clients' home or workplace for collection of deposits; enforcement mechanisms could also discourage shirking by imposing financial fees for early withdrawal of funds or premature closure of the savings account.
Credible commitments are important for poor households who have difficulty in saving.
3 Such difficulty can be due to poor self-control, inattention to planning or family members asking for money insistently. The proliferation of informal financial devices, such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and deposit collectors, shows that the poor feel the need for commitments (Rutherford, 2000; Johnson, 2004; Guerin, 2011) . Also rigid microcredit contracts 5 with a weekly repayment schedule are popular among people with self-control problems (Bauer et al., 2008) . Evidence shows that commitment savings products incorporating appropriate enforcement mechanisms effectively help the poor to reach their savings targets (Ashraf et al., 2005 (Ashraf et al., , 2006 . Given that the poor have the capacity and the willingness to save, credible savings commitments would help them to save towards a foreseen expenditure or simply to build up reserves for use in case of an emergency. Such savings would reduce the vulnerability of the poor to economic shocks and, hopefully, enhance their standard of living.
For microfinance institutions (MFIs), clients' discipline serves to ensure that lenders are more aware of borrowers' financial situations, reducing the likelihood of clients' delinquency and default.
Indeed, not being able to rely on standard collateral, credit scoring systems or legal enforcement, the microfinance industry uses original mechanisms that screen, monitor and provide incentives to borrowers. Those mechanisms are quite rigid and standardized, e.g. joint liability, frequent and regular repayment schedule without grace period, progressive lending, intolerant policy toward default and compulsory savings (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010) .
The importance of flexibility
Product flexibility refers to the ease with which financial transactions are adapted to clients' cash flow (Collins et al., 2009) . Contrary to the typical enforcement mechanisms used in microcredit products, flexible products allow for grace periods in loan repayment; provide for adaptable instalment schedules to avoid burdening clients with high repayments in difficult times; and allow for loan prepayment, loan renegotiation in the case of an income shock, and loan refreshing at some point during the loan cycle (Collins et al., 2009 ). In the case of savings services, flexibility corresponds to the absence of a minimum balance requirement, the voluntary nature of savings and, generally, to the possibility of making deposits and withdrawals of variable amounts at any time.
Flexibility is important for the poor because it helps them to manage money, e.g. smoothing consumption, coping with emergencies and taking advantage of business opportunities. For example, ad hoc payment schedules permit households to save 4 cash as soon as it is available, avoiding the temptation to spend it on miscellaneous expenses (Ravi, 2006) . Allowing for a grace period in loan repayment would expand the range of investment opportunities that loans could be used to finance, including projects that require a lengthy gestation period before realizing consistent profits (Field et al., 2011) . Allowing ex post contract renegotiation, earlier withdrawals in a fixed 6 savings plan or providing for emergency loans, for example, would help poor clients to deal with income shocks or unexpected expenditure needs. Permitting prepayment of loans or offering passbook savings accounts with no restriction on deposits would give the poor a means of investing unexpected small financial surpluses (Meyer, 2002; Karlan and Mullainathan, 2006; Collins et al., 2009; Hudon et al., 2009; Shoji, 2010) .
For MFIs, flexibility is good because it would increase clients' satisfaction, reduce client dropout and encourage new clients to take up the products. Moreover, helping the poor manage their money
should also reduce problems of delinquency and over-indebtedness (Wright, 2001; Chaudhury and Matin, 2002; Meyer, 2002; Karlan and Mullainathan, 2006; Schicks, 2011) .
Balancing flexibility and discipline in microfinance
Product flexibility and clients' discipline are both important in microfinance. However, it seems they are hardly reconciled in single financial products. On the demand side, product flexibility weakens the effectiveness of the commitment and might deteriorate clients' discipline. On the supply side, product flexibility raises MFIs operational expenses and worsen loan repayment rate (Laureti, 2011) . Indeed, MFIs offer standardized products to simplify operations, limit the risk of staff fraud and facilitate liquidity management (Sadoulet, 2002; Karlan and Mullainathan, 2006; Jeon and Menicucci, 2010) . 5 More importantly, standard enforcement mechanisms used in microfinance serve MFIs to deal cost-effectively with information asymmetries, assuring that loans are repaid on time without incurring in excessively high transaction costs. However, standard enforcing mechanisms do not allow financial transactions to be adapted to the clients' cash needs.
Adding flexibility to microfinance would require abandoning those typically rigid enforcement mechanisms. The fear is that this might aggravate clients' behavioural gaps and worsen problems of asymmetric information between the poor clients and MFIs.
There are three main directions taken by the academic literature exploring the trade-off between flexibility and discipline in microfinance. Firstly, some authors study the effect of flexible vs. rigid repayment schedules in loan contracts, in term of clients' delinquency, investment choices and degree of satisfaction. Randomized field experiments provide rigorous empirical evidence, but with contrasting results. Notably, McIntosh (2008) found that a monthly repayment schedule enhanced both clients' repayment of loans and their satisfaction with the product, measured by a decrease in the dropout rate, compared with a weekly repayment schedule. However, in contrast, Field et al. 7 (2011) found that the introduction of a two-month grace period into loan contracts increased delinquency and default.
Secondly, other authors use theoretical models to explain the trade-off and individuate ways to overcome asymmetric information with flexible loan contracts. Generally, those models show that introducing flexibility into loan contracts raises the temptation to default; consequently, in order to encourage financial discipline, the enforcement mechanism, e.g. sanctions for default, should also be strengthened. Fisher and Ghatak (2010) explain that high frequency repayment schedule increases the size of loan clients will take on for a given set of enforcement mechanisms. Sadoulet (2002) shows that repayment insurance should be provided only after the first loan cycle, and only to those clients who achieve a good reputation for loan repayment; however, as the number of loan cycles increase, the effect of the borrower's action on her or his reputation becomes negligible, and the lender must impose additional sanctions to deter defaults and insurance claims. Tedeschi's (2006) model proves that the punishment for defaulting clients need not be a lifetime without credit if the client has much to gain from borrowing.
Thirdly, some authors use randomized control trials (RCTs) to test the efficacy of alternative enforcement mechanisms associated to loans and also commitment savings products, such as visits from deposit collectors or short message service (SMS) reminders. Ashraf et al. (2005) observed a substantial increase in savings and a slight decrease in borrowing among clients chosen at random to receive the deposit collection service. tested the effects of soft enforcements obtained through sending SMSs reminding clients to keep on track on their savings; results show that sending SMSs reminders to make deposits increased savings rate by 6 percent and the likelihood of clients meeting their savings goals by 3 percent. 6 Cadena and Schoar (2011) test SMS reminders on loan contracts and find an improvement in repayment similar to that obtained through financial incentives, i.e. the promise of a 25 percent reduction in the interest rate for good borrowers. Sending SMSs overcomes inattention problems, for example when clients forget when payments are due, and increase salience of future expenditure needs Cadena and Schoar, 2011) . For the same reasons, specially labelled accounts 7 encourage saving because of mental accounting effects (Thaler, 1985) . "Fungibility of money suggests that such accounts should have no effect on savings decisions. However, mental accounting principles suggest that indeed money saved for a particular purpose is likely to be spent on that purpose and hence will affect savings and consumption decisions" (Ashraf et al., 2003: p. 6 ).
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In line with this literature, we aim at providing new insights on the trade-off between product flexibility and clients' financial discipline in microfinance. Specifically, this paper explores ways in which the microfinance industry might introduce flexibility into financial contracts in combination with appropriate enforcement mechanisms. The approach we take is practical and constructive: by looking at existing innovative products that combine flexible features with enforcement mechanisms, we should get some new ideas on how it is possible, in practice, to combine product flexibility with clients' discipline.
To our knowledge, only a few papers in the academic literature extensively discuss existing solutions for implementing flexible contracts in microfinance (for example, Rutherford, 2000; and most of the practitioners' literature analyzes single case studies (exceptions include, for example, Ashraf et al., 2003; CGAP/IFAD, 2006b ). This paper's main contribution is, indeed, to assemble a set of examples of flexible financial products offered by microfinance institutions worldwide, including savings, credit and insurance products.
Innovative products balancing flexibility and financial discipline
This section lists nine innovative products/practices of MFIs worldwide, covering microcredit, microsavings and microinsurance services. These products are innovative primarily because they combine product flexibility with mechanisms to ensure clients' financial discipline; factors such as technology used and originality of products' features played a role in the selection process, but to a lesser extent.
Key information is provided on each product: name/type of product; short description; relevance for the poor, which we call motivation; flexibility features; and enforcement mechanisms (i.e. financial discipline features). Flexibility and enforcement features are discussed in detail, and information about the provider is given, including its location, background, outreach, etc.
SafeSave and Shohoz Shonchoy's savings and loan accounts (Bangladesh)
SafeSave 8 was founded by Stuart Rutherford in 1996 in Dhaka, Bangladesh, offering one basic product: a passbook savings account, which allows maximum flexibility on deposits and withdrawals (any amount at any time). If clients wish, they may take out a loan the amount of which is linked to the client's savings balance and increases with good repayment history. Loans are repaid flexibly with no fixed duration (the minimum monthly payment is the interest). Loan repayment enforcement features include: client must provide financial collateral (savings balance 9 should be at least one third of loan outstanding); and progressive lending (steady repayment progress is required to earn increases to the credit limit). MFI's staff encourages deposits and loan repayments by visiting clients once or twice a day at their home or workplace (see Its flexibility features are highly attractive to the poor: no fee to open the account, no minimum balance, no compulsory deposits or withdrawal restrictions and interest paid monthly on all but the smallest balances (less than USD 10). As of the end of March 2011, BRI had 28.85 million savers, more than 20 million of them holding Simpedes accounts (Oleh Donald Banjarnahor, 2011) .
The most innovative feature of Simpedes accounts is its linkage to a lottery. Twice a year BRI issues free lottery tickets to Simpedes account holders, the number depending on the holder's minimum monthly account balance. As the lotteries are held in the branches, winners are located within a small area and most local people have either won a prize or know someone who has, which makes the lotteries very popular. The lottery is a commitment mechanism as rewards clients with large savings balances.
A less celebrated innovative aspect of the Simpedes account is its compliance with the principles of finance practitioners (Permatasari, 2010; Weill, 2010) . According to the principles of Islamic finance, a savings product should not impose fees or any other restrictive conditions on deposits and withdrawals and should not pay interest to depositors. In savings products based on a Mudaraba contract (under which one party provides money and the other carries out work) -as Simpedes seems to be -rewards for clients are justified as being a sharing of revenue or profit between the bank and the depositors: clients must maintain a minimum balance to qualify for a share of the profits (Obaidullah, 2008) . Ashraf et al. (2003) mention various financial institutions around the world that offer fixed savings vehicles, including Vivekananda Sevakendra Sishu Uddyon (VSSU) in India. We selected VSSU for the variety of fixed savings plans it offers -daily, weekly, monthly and term deposits -and for their contractual terms and conditions, which together appear to offer a good balance between discipline and flexibility (see table 4 ). VSSU savings plans are medium-to long-term and require a minimum deposit of USD 0.2 to USD 1 per period (table 5) . In addition to enforcement features typical of such products, such as preplanning of a regular deposits schedule, VSSU visits clients at their doorstep to collect deposits, so to encourage savers' financial discipline.
Fixed savings plan by Vivekananda Sevakendra Sishu Uddyon (India)
Account holders are permitted to close their accounts or to withdraw some money prematurely with respect to the predetermined savings plan. This provides the degree of flexibility needed to make the savings plans attractive to low-income clients, providing a safety net for urgent unexpected expenses. The temptation for clients to renege on their commitment is balanced by financial occur within the first 12 months of contracts, which is a good mechanism to balance the temptation to pull out of the commitment, which is highest in the first period of the contract (table 6) . 
Susu collectors and Barclays Bank in Ghana
Informal financial devices can offer flexibility and convenience to local communities. However they are mostly unreliable and perform poorly, offering a limited variety of financial services and little in the way of funds. Linking formal and informal financial services providers could improve the service offered by combining the strengths of the two types of institution (Pagura and Kirsten, 2006) . This is the rationale behind the linkage between susu collectors and Barclays Bank in Ghana (see table 7 ).
16 The loan and savings services offered by susu collectors to local communities in Ghana are convenient and flexible in that they lack bureaucracy and paper work, provide a door-step service, and allow changes in their informal contract terms to meet clients circumstances. They promote financial discipline through the daily visit of collectors to the clients' homes. Close clients monitoring is possible thanks to the physical and cultural proximity of susu collectors to the local economy and their clientele; it discourage clients from shirking strategically on their commitments, enhancing financial discipline.
Innovative M-banking products linked to M-Pesa wallets (Kenya)
Branchless banking through mobile phones (m-banking) is probably the most promising innovation in rural finance in the last few years. Using a network of retail agents and the existing mobile phone 15 infrastructure, potentially even distant and sparsely populated areas can be reached with reliable banking services. The first wave of branchless banking efforts focused on providing payment and money-transfer services. The next challenge is to link mobile money with a full range of banking services (CGAP, 2010; Pickens, 2010) .
Safaricom, 17 the Kenyan mobile network operator behind M-Pesa, allows its 13 million customers to transfer money via their mobile phones and through the countrywide network of more than 23 000 agents (Safaricom, 2010) . Today, Safaricom, in partnership with a variety of operators (e.g.
banks, non-profit organizations, insurance companies, health-service providers, etc.) is piloting innovative m-banking products. Among those, we selected two innovative services for their relevance to the paper's focus and a third product for its rural application (table 8) M-Kesho is a bank account linked to a client's M-Pesa account. This permits holders to store money (M-Kesho has no maximum savings balance, unlike an M-Pesa account) and also to tap into loan and insurance facilities. Only electronic transactions are allowed to and from M-Kesho. had opened accounts, though activity on these accounts remains low (Radcliffe, 2010) .
Mamakiba is a savings plan designed to help pregnant women to pay for their maternal health needs. A mix of enforcement mechanisms encourages savings. Firstly, a savings calculator helps determine the total savings target and the minimum periodical payments necessary to reach it, taking into account the woman's cash availability and health needs. Secondly, SMS messages remind the women to save, confirm deposits and provide updates of total savings and the remaining amount to be saved. SMS alerts warn the client if she has not met her savings target and ask for new and it expects to reach up to 25,000 farmers in 2012 (UAP, 2011).
Seasonal loans by Confianza (Peru) and Banco Los Andes ProCredit (Bolivia)
Expenses for agricultural activities and income from them are typically seasonal and depend on crop and livestock cycles. As a result, the rigid disbursement and repayment schedules of standard Both institutions adopt a strategy of strict credit discipline combined with adapting their loan products to rural clients' needs (table 9) . 20 Confianza poses strict lending requirements, serving only households with a diversified income stream, and monitors loans closely through a network of loan officers in the field. Banco Los Andes has established a strong reputation for not tolerating delinquency; loan officers visit clients immediately after the first missed payment. It charges high interest rates to clients who have defaulted on payments and lower interest rates to clients in good standing. It has also adopted a flexible approach to collateral, focusing on the value of pledged assets to the borrower rather than the recovery value for the lender.
As of the end of December 2010, Confianza had 10 250 rural clients, equivalent to 13 percent of its total active clients (75 813). Rural clients had loans totalling USD 25 million, almost 19 percent of the institution's total gross loan portfolio; average loan per rural borrower was USD 2 455, higher than the institution's average loan (table 10) .
Banco Los Andes ProCredit reported that its agricultural credit portfolio amounted to USD 5 834 000 at end December 2010, equal to only 1.5 percent of its total gross loan portfolio ( 18 offers emergency lines of credit to clients with good repayment histories, whereas Banco Los Andes emphasizes its rapid allocation and disbursement process. However, even thought their products are adapted to crop cycles, loans by Confianza and Banco Los Andes have two limitations: firstly, they are short term, responding only to seasonal working capital needs; and secondly, they do not protect rural household from major systemic shocks due to natural disasters or volatility of market prices. 
Rural credit from Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (Thailand)
In addition to predictable seasonality of income and expenditure, agriculture is subject to high systemic risk which is usually co-variant, e.g. natural disasters such as flood and draught lead to market price volatility. These risks lead to a high degree of uncertainty in smallholder farmers' income, which is usually coupled with a lack of appropriate financial strategies for consumption smoothing. Moreover, raising agricultural productivity requires long-term investments. According to a FAO study (FAO, 2003) , state development banks and member-owned institutions, such as Thailand's Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), 22 are the most successful in providing such long-term financing for agriculture. BAAC provides smallholder farmers with short-term loans (6-18 months) for seasonal needs and medium-and long-term loans for financing investment (up to 20 years in the case of purchase of land and machinery) (Saila, 2010) . BAAC allows clients to reschedule their loans if they face major repayment difficulties due to flood, drought, etc. (Townsend and Yaron (2001) . To limit moral hazard, credit officers in the field monitor clients' circumstances and punitive interest rates are applied to cheaters (table 11) .
At end March 2010 a total of 6.10 million farm households had access to BAAC's credit services.
Credit is extended mostly to individual households (4.5 million households); fewer households received credit as members of agricultural cooperatives or farmers' associations (1.6 million households). The gross loan portfolio to farm households was 475.4 billion baht (approximately USD 16 billion at July 2011 exchange rate), of which 449.7 billion baht was loaned to individual farmers. Roughly 8 percent of the farm gross loan portfolio (38 billion baht) is in arrears for longer than 90 days (BAAC, 2010).
BAAC protects farmers' income against price volatility through farm income guarantee schemes covering the three main cash crops -rice, cassava and maize. This scheme was introduced in 2009 to replace the crop pledging scheme the bank operated previously. Under the schemes farmers are compensated for the differences between the reference crop prices and guaranteed prices set by the government. To limit fraud, inspection committees hold meetings at the village or community level to publicly verify and confirm the farmers' farm size and crop production volume. At the end of March 2010 a total of 3 787 556 farm households were entitled to receive compensation worth 35.4 billion baht (BAAC, 2010: p. 165 ).
Housing microfinance and other long term loans by the Indian Association of Savings and

Credit (India)
The Indian Association of Savings and Credit (IASC) 23 was created in 1998 as a venture between the Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC) and Palmyrah Workers Development Society (PWDS). HDFC is a leading private-sector housing lender; PWDS is a grass-roots nongovernmental organization operating in Tamil Nadu, India. IASC offers long-term credit to cover big-ticket expenses for various purposes -business, housing, education, etc. -to low-income clients (table 12) .
Clients are organized in self-help groups. The groups must show a good credit record, regular meeting participation and internal management capacity for at least one year before becoming 23 www.iasc.in.
20 eligible for loans. The groups must also have a minimum amount of regular savings from each member and a minimum group savings balance before they can link with IASC. IASC offers many types of products (table 13) . Loans for economic activity are differentiated between farm and non-farm businesses and are issued for 3 years. Housing loans are available both for repair and maintenance and for the construction of a new house, with the maturity varying between 2 and 15 years. Loans are also available for education expenses, to cover medical emergencies, for marriage expenses, for disaster mitigation, for redemption, etc. Loans are repaid in regular monthly instalments. A security deposit of 5 percent is compulsory. Loans may be paid off early, but the institution charges a fee for it. Approximately 90 percent of members of self-help groups have an average individual income between 1 000 and 3 000 rupees per month (USD 22-67) (Centre for Micro Finance, n.d.). IASC website reports over 34 000 active borrowers in 6 513 groups at the end of March 2010 (Table 14) .
IASC issued 30 000 loans in 2009-10 with a total value of 307.9 million rupees (USD 7 million) 21 and an average loan size of 10 264 rupees (USD 230). By March 2010, IASC had 24 branches covering 875 villages (table 14) . The SEWA composite insurance product has a number of innovative flexibility features (table 15):
• Clients can choose between various insurance schemes that differ in the amount of the annual premium and benefits.
• SEWA gives clients the possibility to pay their premium in cash or from the interest on fixed deposits. Payments can be annual, quarterly or monthly.
22
• SEWA, along with Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) of India, has also introduced a special plan, "Jeevan Madhur", which is a simple savings-linked life insurance plan where the individual member pays premiums annually.
Vimo SEWA began with 7 000 members in 1992, and currently has 120 000 members, a small number of clients considering the Indian context. Until recently, half of the members dropped out each year. The renewal rate has now increased to 60 percent, and SEWA is aiming to bring it to 80 percent. Recently, SEWA has started to send members SMSs to remind them when it is time to pay their premiums and to give members no-claims discounts; a 2010 analysis of Vimo SEWA's claims showed that over 40 percent claims were for readily preventable conditions or conditions that could have been treated without hospitalization (Yadav, 2010) .
Lessons learned
The practices we have reviewed show that flexibility -adaptability of transactions to clients' cash flow -can have various forms. Loans of Confianza and Banco Los Andes Procredit allow financial transactions to be tailored to clients' future cash needs. Disbursement and repayment, however, are predetermined; clients commit to those and are not allowed to alter those commitments. In contrast, BAAC offers the possibility to adjusting the loan payment schedule in the event of emergencies and negative shocks; VSSU allows early withdrawals or premature account closure on its fixed savings plans at the costs of some fees; and IASC allows clients to pay off loans early, but charges a fee.
In both types of flexibility, i.e. seasonal loans and ex-post contract renegotiation, screening, monitoring and/or incentive mechanisms adopted by the MFIs are quite stringent, which should assure financial discipline. Confianza and Banco Los Andes Procredit lend only to households with diversified income sources, monitor client accounts rigorously and have a rigid policy toward default. BAAC has adopted a different approach, requiring physical or social collateral from borrowers as a covenant, and uses its staff in the field to verify clients' circumstances in case of a request to reschedule a loan; cheaters are faced with punitive interest rates.
In both cases, MFIs incur additional costs for acquiring information on borrowers, which could be avoided in rigid products. For instance, lending only to households with diversified income sources reduces the risk of default, because the client can draw on various sources to meet repayments, but verifying sources of income can be a costly exercise. Similarly, BAAC's incurs costs in verifying the causes of default if the client requests rescheduling of a loan; such costs would be avoided if rescheduling was not an option. However, applying a weekly repayment schedule, for example, provides the MFI with up-to-date information on households' cash flow without the need for costly information-gathering operations (Jain and Mansuri, 2003; Armendariz and Morduch, 2010) .
A different type of flexibility is offered by SafeSave in Bangladesh, linking loans to voluntary savings. SafeSave's loans do not set any repayment schedule and do not have any maturity; the only compulsory payment is interest, leaving the client to decide when and how much capital to repay.
There is no commitment to a given plan -with the exception of the interest payments -or, looked at from a different perspective, shirking is permissible. To impose discipline, SafeSave employs a requirement to provide financial collateral, progressive lending and collectors. Collins et al. (2009) explain the value of financial collateral, i.e. linking (voluntary) savings to loans: "Although uncollateralized lending has been one of the proudest boasts of the microfinance movement, the judicious use of financial collateral can make loans more usable for the poor: the diaries show that many poor people do not object to 'borrowing back their own savings' partly because they value the savings so highly that they would rather borrow against them than draw them down, and partly because having the savings reassures them that should difficulties arise they can set their loan off against their savings" (Collins et al., 2009: p. 182 ).
Three out the nine products/practices described in this paper employ deposit collectors to enforce payments, either for loan repayment or savings deposits (i.e. SafeSave, Barclays Bank and VSSU).
Although collectors provide a highly convenient service for clients they are a cost to the MFI, requiring a large number of staff covering considerable distances in order to reach each client daily.
To reduce the cost, both SafeSave and Barlays Bank employ (low-paid) local people, through whom they gain access to locally embedded relations and valuable information. SafeSave hires staff from the same slums where clients live; and Barclays Bank hires (i.e. links to) existing susu collectors.
Finally, transaction costs and innovation inevitably lead to discussion of branchless banking and, particularly, m-banking. The m-banking savings plan for pregnant women, Mamakiba, is not a compulsory savings plan, offering the same degree of flexibility as passbook savings accounts (such as those offered by SafeSave). However, it employs at least three soft commitment devices to encourage financial discipline: first, the savings calculator helps clients to plan their savings; second, SMSs sent through mobile phones remind people to pay, provides updates on savings balances, etc.; and third, tying savings to a specific use may encourage deposits.
Concluding remarks
This review shows that there are ways the microfinance industry can offer flexible financial products that also encourage financial discipline. Flexibility serves to facilitate money management 24 for low-income clients, whereas commitments accompanied with appropriate enforcement mechanisms serve to encourage financial discipline. The exact mix of flexibility features and enforcement mechanisms that works best will be determined by the characteristics of the target clientele.
Various types of flexibility in financial products could be valuable for the poor. Ex ante flexibility (called 'rigid flexibility' by Karlan and Mullainathan, 2006 ) fixes a payment schedule that matches with clients' future cash needs; ex post flexibility allows deviation from fixed plans under specific conditions; and pure flexibility leaves full discretion on timing and amount of payments. These different types of flexibility have implications for the credibility and effectiveness of the commitments. Ex ante flexibility by itself is a pure commitment and should encourage discipline and lessen concerns of weakness in management information, fraud by staff and liquidity management. However, it may be less effective than a standardized rule that imposes frequency and regularity of transactions and meetings. Ex post flexibility weakens the credibility of commitments and aggravates temptation issues. Pure flexibility, by itself, does not impose any commitment.
Generally, the introduction of flexibility requires MFIs to adopt alternative enforcement mechanisms for establishing clients' discipline. Regarding loan contracts, introducing flexibility requires MFIs to balance the increased credit risk by adopting rigorous lending policies. For example, MFIs should concede flexible repayment schedule only to the best clients; ask for more collateral; deploy more staff in the field to monitor clients rigorously; and generally raise the sanctions for default so as to balance the increased temptation.
Regarding savings, our review points to the important role of soft commitments in enhancing discipline, i.e. commitments associated with enforcement mechanisms inflicting psychological sanctions to the individual. Such soft enforcement mechanisms include tools to help clients to plan their savings, visits from deposit collectors or SMSs to remind clients to make deposits or repayments, and application of mental accounting principles through specially labelled accounts, for example. These mechanisms should encourage clients to save and, at the same time, leave them some flexibility to facilitate their money management. Indeed, we see soft commitments as one of the most promising ways the microfinance industry could mix flexibility and enforcement in microsavings products.
This review suggests two potential trade-offs when balancing flexibility and discipline, mainly for the credit market. First, flexibility may result in higher costs for enforcing loan contracts, especially for acquiring information on clients to evaluate their preferences, repayment capacity, etc.
Considering that, in developing country contexts, the unit of analysis is commonly the entire household, rather than an individual, gathering such information may be a major problem for MFIs.
Second, MFIs tend to offer flexibility to privileged clients, e.g. households with diversified cash flow (Confianza and Banco Los Andes), households with large savings and good credit history (SafeSave and IASC), household with collateral (BAAC) and households that already have access to informal finance channels (Barclays Bank). This will tend to exclude poorer, more vulnerable households that may benefit most from access to credit.
The microfinance literature indicates that market-oriented approaches offer important gains in both long-term institutional sustainability and social impact. This review shows that flexibility increases MFIs' costs but does not seem to bring with it a broadening of their client base. Research is needed to verify these perceptions, perhaps through collection of rigorous empirical evidence. In-depth case-studies of one or more of the institutions covered by this review could help understand the costs of flexibility for the MFIs, whether these costs are passed on to the clients through, for example, higher interest rates on loans, and the typology of clientele to which flexibility is addressed. Randomized field experiments would be the best methodology to evaluate the impact of product flexibility on variables such as clients' default and satisfaction rates.
The microfinance practices we have reviewed combine flexibility and discipline within one product.
Alternatively, flexibility and discipline could be offered in separate products accessible simultaneously to clients. For example, MFIs could offer emergency loans to good clients; such loans could be disbursed rapidly and for a short term (e.g. 1 or 2 months) and be designed especially to deal with the effects of an income shock or an unexpected expenditure need (for example, FAI et al., 2011) . Flexibility and discipline could be offered simultaneously through two distinct savings products, such as a flexible passbook savings account and a disciplined commitment savings account. The Grameen Bank II System is a good example of this approach.
25 Clients would use a passbook savings account for day-to-day money management, to deposit daily small surpluses and to have fast liquidity access when needed, while the commitment savings account would provide the structure necessary to accumulate a large lump sum for some future planned expenditure. Crossselling various financial products would strengthen the relationships between the MFIs and the clientele, bringing comparative advantage to the service providers.
25 www.grameen-info.org.
